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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0834
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0786
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1138
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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000192

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Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte FOR REASONS 1.4 (c) AND (e)

Summary

- [11](#). (C) P5 1 experts and an EU representative met at the U.K. Mission on March 9 to discuss technical issues contained in the IAEA Director Ger
- [12](#). (C) France, the U.K., and the U.S. provided all the presentations on Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, weaponization-related activities, and IAEA

The Enrichment Part of the Fuel Cycle

- [13](#). (C) The French began the discussion by highlighting Iran's indigenous sources of uranium -- from phosphate deposits (a potential future sou
- [14](#). (C) The U.S. noted that operations at the UCF already have been impacted by the uranium shortage and that Iran can never be fully independ
- [15](#). (C) Turning to enrichment-related activities, the U.K. led the discussion with a detailed presentation on Iran's centrifuge progress and pe
- [16](#). (C) Russia agreed that equipping all 8 cascade units or beyond at Natanz with P-1/IR-1 machines was a "waste" in the commercial context. Ru
- [17](#). (C) The U.S. asked what were the drivers--political, technical, or both--for Iran not feeding UF6 into the nine installed, but not-yet-oper
- [18](#). (C) Germany said it had a "feeling" that Iran would use the first cascade hall of 27,000 machines for the IR-1 centrifuges and fill the sec
- [19](#). (C) France presented a chart of Iran's production of low enriched UF6 and asked for others' assessments on how much low enriched uranium (I

The Reactor Side of Things

- [10](#). (C) The U.K. led a short discussion on reactors and fuel fabrication, noting that this section of Iran's fuel cycle was well behind the ur
- [11](#). (C) France asked if the 10-load contract had actually been signed by the Iranians and was "in effect." Russia responded that the contract

Concerns with Lack of Progress on
Possible Military Dimensions

- [12](#). (C) The U.S. started the discussion on possible military dimensions (PMD) and noted the IAEA has not been able to make any progress on t
- [13](#). (C) Recalling the U.S. Intelligence Community's assessment in the 2007 NIE that Iran halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003, France asked
- [14](#). (C) The U.K. expressed concern that the PMD issues receive less and less attention in the DG's reports. Russia agreed, but noted its vie
- [15](#). (C) The DCM from the German Mission asked why copies of the alleged studies information could not be provided to Iran and remarked that

Other Outstanding Issues

- [16](#). (C) The U.S. noted that in addition to the outstanding issues related to PMD, Iran still has not clarified the IAEA's concerns about the r

Safeguards and Verification

- [17](#). (C) France took the lead in discussing safeguards and verification of Iran's nuclear program by mentioning that the IAEA has been able to
- [18](#). (C) Describing additional concerns about the IAEA's ability to verify/investigate Iran's nuclear program, France stated that there were

U.K.'s Summary of Discussions

- [19](#). (C) The U.K. Ambassador summarized the main points from the meeting, stating clearly these were not "official, agreed to positions," but j
- Iran's centrifuge operations in 2008 had improved from 2007, but the centrifuge performance still was relatively poor and not at a steady sta
- the performance of Iran's centrifuge operations was not adequate to achieve Tehran's stated commercial goals;
- delays in centrifuge cascade commissioning may have more to do with centrifuge operators attempting to address performance problems than any
- Session with DDG Heinonen

- [20](#). (C) As requested, Heinonen and IAEA weapons expert XXXXXXXXXXXX joined the meeting before it concluded. After a brief summary of the agend
- [21](#). (C) Regarding the question of providing copies of "alleged studies" documents to Iran, Heinonen explained in detail that the IAEA has beer
- [22](#). (C) Responding to a question from the French about visas and the designation of inspectors for Iran, Heinonen said the IAEA currently had
- [23](#). (C) Germany asked if the LEU produced at Natanz was for Bushehr fuel and if Iran could enrich uranium beyond 3.5 percent. Heinonen said th
- [24](#). (C) Responding to the U.S. question about the source of the uranium dioxide (UO2) that Iran is using to produce fuel rods at the FMP, Heir
- [25](#). (C) The U.S. commented about the difference between a State's legal obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and transpar
- [26](#). (C) China noted that the assessed SWU for Iran's operations of the IR-1 centrifuge in 2008 was 0.6 and asked if this low number was becaus
- [27](#). (C) Responding to Germany's question about the status of the uranium metal production line at the UCF, Heinonen explained that Iran has ye
- [28](#). (C) China inquired about how many centrifuge components and raw material for component manufacturing Iran currently has. Heinonen explaine

Comment

- [29](#). (C) The U.S. delegation believed this meeting worthwhile as a means for engaging Russian and Chinese experts on the technical facts of the
- XXXXXXXXXXXXXX